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Mere Words: The 'Enemy Entity'
Designation of the Gaza Strip
By CAREY JAMES*
I. Introduction
In August and September 2005, Israel withdrew its military
personnel and civilian settlers from the Gaza Strip. Israeli soldiers
had been in Gaza for nearly four decades, and twenty-one Israeli
settlements housing 8,500 settlers had been established there. But
on September 12, 2005, the settlements having been evacuated and
demolished, the last Israeli troops lowered the flag over their
headquarters in the Strip and left.' Israel's Disengagement Plan,
prepared before the withdrawal, stated that with the absence of
"any permanent presence of Israeli security forces or Israeli
civilians" in Gaza, "there will be no basis for claiming that the Gaza
Strip is occupied." 2 For reasons that will be discussed below,
however, this argument has not been widely accepted, and as a
matter of international law, Gaza is still generally regarded as
occupied. 3 The primary significance of designating a territory
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, May
2009. The author would like to thank Professor Omar Dajani, Rose Mishaan, and
Sara Elturk for their guidance and support.
1. Scott Wilson, Israel Lowers its Flag in Gaza as Last Troops Withdraw;
Palestinians Enter Settlement Area, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2005, at A14.
2. Disengagement Plan - General Outline (Apr. 18, 2004), § 2, art. i(3),
available at http:/ / www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/ Reference+Documents/
Disengage ment+Plan+-+General+Outline.htm.
3. See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council, UN Human Rights Council: Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories
Occupied since 1967, 6, A/HRC/4/17 (Jan. 29, 2007) [hereinafter Report of Special
Rapporteur 2006] (prepared by John Dugard), available at http://www.unhcr.org/
refworld/docid/461e52b12.html ("In August 2005, Israel withdrew its settlers and
armed forces from Gaza. Statements by the Government of Israel that the
withdrawal ended the occupation of Gaza are grossly inaccurate."); see also Human
Rights Watch, Israel: Threatened Sanctions on Gaza Violate Laws of War, Sept. 20, 2007,
[hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Threatened], http://www.hrw.org/en/news/
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occupied derives from the obligations and responsibilities
international law requires of an occupying power vis-A-vis the
population of the territory it occupies. In its Revised
Disengagement Plan, Israel maintained that its withdrawal would
"serve to dispel the claims regarding Israel's responsibility for the
Palestinians within the Gaza Strip." 4 Israel's position was thus that
its withdrawal from Gaza would end the occupation and that,
accordingly, Israel would no longer be obliged to abide by the law
of occupation in its relations with Gaza. Israel's actions and the
facts which characterize its continuing relationship with Gaza,
however, do not support its position, and it has been repeatedly
demonstrated that Israel has not legitimately divested itself of its
obligations as an occupying power.5
Israel's continued status as an occupying power arises from,
inter alia, the fact that Israel continues to control Gaza's airspace,6
coast,7  electricity, population registry, telecommunications
networks, and water sewage;8 "continues to exercise complete
control over the movement of goods into the Gaza Strip;" 9 and
continues to exercise exclusive control over all but one export
crossing. 10  Additionally, Israel, according to its Revised
Disengagement Plan, reserves the right to use force in "self-defense"
in Gaza," and it conducts military operations there on a regular
basis. A recent release by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
2007/09/19/israel-threatened-sanctions-gaza-violate-laws-war ("Israel remains an
occupying power in the Gaza Strip even though it withdrew its military forces and
illegal civilian settlers in August and September 2005.")
4. The Cabinet Resolution Regarding the Disengagement Plan (June 6, 2004)
[hereinafter Revised Disengagement Plan], available at http://www.strategic
assessments.org/library/Disengagement/RevisedDisengagementPlan..-
_CabinetLApprovalJune_2004.pdf. See also Ian Scobbie, An Intimate Disengagement:
Israel's Withdrawal from Gaza, the Law of Occupation and of Self-Determination, 11 Y.B.
OF ISLAMIC AND MIDDLE EASTERN L. 3,12 (2004-05).
5. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Civilians Should Not Be Penalized for Rocket
Attacks by Armed Groups, Oct. 29, 2007 [hereinafter Human Rights Watch, Civilians],
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/10/29/isrlpa17198-txt.htm.
6. Revised Disengagement Plan, supra note 4, add. A, § 3, art. 1.1.
7. B'Tselem, The Scope of Israeli Control in the Gaza Strip,
http://www.btselem.org/english/Gaza-Strip/GazaStatus.asp (Last Visited Apr.
8, 2009).
8. Human Rights Watch, Civilians, supra note 5.
9. B'Tselem, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. Revised Disengagement Plan, supra note 4, § 3, art. 1.3.
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describing events in Gaza from June 15 to September 15, 2007, for
example, refers to several Israeli operations in Gaza, including "a
counter-terrorist operation in the central Gaza Strip" and "an IDF
force operating deep in the Gaza Strip," and states that an Israeli
soldier was killed during one of these missions. The report also
states that in the three-month period it covers, forty Palestinians
from Gaza were killed by Israeli forces, all within Gaza.12 Speaking
of the withdrawal, Ambassador Gideon Meir of the Israeli Foreign
Ministry noted that "instead of being happy and celebrating the
Israeli departure from Gaza," the Palestinians "are whining and
crying." 13 Indeed, one can only marvel at Palestinian dissatisfaction
with such a withdrawal.
In September 2007 - two years after Israel's withdrawal from
Gaza and after a series of developments in the Occupied Territories
which will be discussed below - the Israeli Security Cabinet
declared Gaza a "hostile territory." 14 The Israeli Ministry of Foreign
Affairs announced that in light of Gaza's status as a "hostile
territory," the Security Cabinet had unanimously decided on a
"continuation of military and counter-terrorist operations against
the terrorist organizations" in Gaza.15 The Ministry also stated that
"additional sanctions will be placed on the Hamas Regime in order
to restrict the passage of various goods to the Gaza Strip and reduce
the supply of fuel and electricity."' 6 The probable purposes of the
"hostile territory" designation, the legal implications of that
designation, and the legality of Israel's policies relating to the
designation are the subjects of this commentary.
With the "hostile territory" designation, Israel likely aims to (1)
narrow the spectrum of humanitarian law applicable to its actions in
Gaza, (2) blur the applicability of those provisions of humanitarian
12. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Terror in Gaza: Three Months Since the




13. Wilson, supra note 1, at A14.
14. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Security Cabinet Declares Gaza Hostile
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law it cannot escape entirely, (3) rid itself of its human rights
obligations to the population of the Gaza Strip, (4) add legal validity
to its claim of the right to self-defense against Gaza, and (5)
obfuscate its status with regard to Gaza and legitimize its continued
use of force in the eyes of the world. The first four aims are legal;
the last is propagandistic. An analysis of the facts and relevant
international law will determine whether the designation and the
policies accompanying it successfully achieve any of these goals.
My thesis is that such an analysis demonstrates that the "hostile
territory" designation has no legal significance, does not change
Israel's responsibilities for the inhabitants of Gaza, and does not
provide a basis for further sanctions by Israel. Accordingly, if the
designation has any effect at all, it will probably be only in the
sphere of public relations.
II. From Withdrawal to Designation
The two-year interval between Israel's "disengagement" from
the Gaza Strip and its designation of Gaza as a "hostile territory"
was a period of significant political change in the Occupied
Palestinian Territories and in Gaza in particular. Because Israel
relies in part on the changes that took place within Gaza during this
period - particularly on Gaza coming under Hamas' control, - as a
basis for its recent policy change, a brief sketch of these events is
necessary.
Long before Israel began dismantling its settlements in Gaza
and preparing to move its troops back across the border into Israel,
the Palestinian Authority ("PA") and the Fatah party which largely
controls it had begun to lose credibility in the eyes of many
Palestinians, who increasingly viewed the PA and Fatah as corrupt
and ineffectual. 1 7 There have been several partially successful
attempts at reform within the PA, but internal forces and resistance
have limited their effectiveness. Israel's continued occupation and
settlement expansion and the PA's perceived inability to deal
effectively with Israeli actions have contributed to growing
dissatisfaction with the status quo among Palestinians.18 This was
17. Scott Wilson & Glenn Kessler, US Funds Enter Fray in Palestinian Elections;
Bush Administration Uses USAID as Invisible Conduit, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 2006, at
Al.
18. Khalil Shikaki, The Future of Palestine Foreign Affairs, FOREIGN AFF.,
(Nov./Dec. 2004).
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the prevailing atmosphere in the Occupied Territories when it was
announced that, for the first time in a decade, Palestinian national
elections would be held in January 2006.19
As the elections approached, the Bush administration began a
campaign to "enhance democratic institutions and support
democratic actors" in the Occupied Territories. 20 This was achieved
by spending nearly $2 million via the United States Agency for
International Development ("USAID") to boost Fatah in the
elections. The Washington Post reported that "the plan's $2 million
budget... is likely more than what any Palestinian Party will have
spent by election day."21 The money was carefully managed and
U.S. involvement kept silent so that any benefit bestowed on Fatah
would not be tainted by association with the United States.
22
The USAID program was not as successful as hoped, and when
the results of the election were tallied, Hamas, Fatah's main rival
and a group classified by the U.S. and Israel as a terrorist
organization, had won some 74 seats in the 132-member Palestinian
parliament. 23 Palestinians had made a democratic choice in voting
Hamas into power, and the United States, pursuant to its much
publicized commitment to democracy, immediately began
consulting with Israel on how that choice might be undermined.
Less than a month after the elections, the New York Times reported
that, according to "Israeli officials and Western Diplomats," the
United States and Israel were engaged in a plan to apply
international pressure, stop U.S. aid, and withhold Palestinian tax
funds collected by Israel in the hope that "Palestinians will be so
unhappy with life under Hamas that they will return to office a
reformed and chastened Fatah movement."24 Israel and the United
States denied the aim of the plan but confirmed its content the next
19. Wilson & Kessler, supra note 17.
20. Steven Erlanger, US Spent $1.9 Million to Aid Fatah in Palestinian Elections,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at All (quoting a spokesman for the U.S. consulate in East
Jerusalem).
21. Wilson & Kessler, supra note 17.
22. Id. The commitment to democracy was impressive. However, it's not hard
to imagine U.S. reaction if it were discovered that Hamas had secretly contributed
more than either major political party to a U.S. presidential candidate.
23. Steven Erlanger, US and Israelis are Said to Talk of Hamas Ouster, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 2006, at Al.
24. Id.
20091
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day.25  Both the White House Press Secretary and a State
Department Spokesman repeated the already established US
position that Hamas would be required to recognize Israel,
renounce the use of violence, and "accept previous agreements" 26
before it would be dealt with by the United States. No such
conditions, of course, were placed on Israel.27
Partly as a result of U.S. efforts to pressure Hamas and bolster
Fatah, tensions continued to grow between the two parties.28 The
struggle culminated in June 2007 in a week of bloody fighting
during which Hamas expelled Fatah from Gaza. With Hamas in
total control of the Strip, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas
dismissed the Hamas dominated government and swore in an
emergency government, which, less than a month later, was
replaced by a caretaker government, also appointed by President
Abbas.29 Hamas immediately announced that it would not deal
with the caretaker government, which it insisted was illegal. 30
Thus, as the summer of 2007 drew to a close, the West Bank and
Gaza, the two Palestinian territories that were to comprise any
future Palestinian State, were isolated from one another as never
before. For Israel and the United States, this division fostered, or at
least allowed for, different policies for each of the two entities.31
25. Steven R. Weisman, US and Israel Deny Plans to Drive Hamas From Power,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 15, 2006, at A2.
26. Id.
27. Thus, Israel is presumably free to continue to disallow the very existence of
a Palestinian state (much less recognize it), engage in systematic and extensive
violence (including targeted assassinations and blatantly disregard international
law, Security Council resolutions, and the World Court) without fear that U.S. aid
will be stopped.
28. David Samuels reports that, "eager to reverse the results of the election,"
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice developed and implemented a plan
to put pressure on the Hamas government by providing the Palestinian
security forces loyal to [Palestinian President Mahmoud] Abbas with
training, intelligence, and large shipments of supplies and new weapons,
paid for by the United States and Saudi Arabia. The hope was that Hamas,
faced with a well-armed, well-trained force of Fatah fighters, might be
cowed into moderating its positions or relinquishing the power it had won
through elections.
David Samuels, Last Chance: Inside Condoleezza Rice's Ploy to Defuse a Nuclear Middle
East, ATLANTic MONTHLY, June 2007, at 54.
29. Isabel Kershner, Hamas Declares as Illegal Latest Effort at Government, N.Y.
TIMES, July 15, 2007, at A8.
30. Id.
31. Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni announced, "Israel needs to adopt a
[Vol. 32:2
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This was the situation in the weeks leading up to the "hostile
territory" designation - two Palestinian territories, both occupied by
Israel,32 both administered by different groups, each hostile to the
other. Complicating matters further were the rocket attacks. Since
September of 2000, when the Second Intifada erupted in the
Palestinian territories, thousands of primitive rockets had been fired
from Gaza into southern Israel by Palestinian militants. Twelve
Israelis have been killed in such attacks.33
The Israeli Security Cabinet convened on September 5, 2007, to
discuss the situation and reconvened on September 19. It was at the
September 19 meeting that the "hostile territory" designation was
adopted. 34 "We today declared that the Gaza Strip is a hostile
territory," Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni announced. 35 "What
this means is that although when it comes to humanitarian needs we
have responsibility, all needs which go beyond humanitarian needs
will not be supplied by Israel to the Gaza Strip." 36 The designation,
Israel asserted, "provides a basis for sanctions on the Hamas
radically different policy, towards the pragmatic leadership now ruling the West
Bank on the one hand... and towards Gaza and the extremists there on the other."
Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Statements by Israeli FM Livni regarding Israeli
Policy Toward the Hamas and its Terrorism, Oct. 1, 2007, [hereinafter Livni
Statements], available at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/
Foreign+Minister+Livni/Speeches+interviews/Statements+by+Israeli+FM+Livni+
regarding+Israeli+policy+toward+the+Hamas+and+its+terrorism+11-Sep-20.htm.
Steven Erlanger reported on June 17, 2007, that "Israel and the United States seem
agreed on a policy to treat them [Gaza and the West Bank] as separate entities to
support Fatah in the West Bank and squeeze Hamas in the Gaza Strip." Steve
Erlanger, New Mideast, New Strategy, N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 2007, at Al.
32. Again, the legal specifics for the conclusion that Gaza is still occupied after
the withdrawal will be discussed in detail below, but this conclusion is widely
accepted and strongly supported. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Israel:
'Disengagement' Will Not End Gaza Occupation, (Oct. 29, 2004), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2004/10/28/israel-disengagement-will-not-end-
gaza-occupation?print.
33. Scott Wilson, Israeli Panel Declares Gaza a 'Hostile Entity Strip's Supply of
Fuel, Electricity to Be Cut, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2007, at A14. Palestinian casualties
in Gaza have been far more extensive. For example, as U.N. Special Rapporteur
John Dugard reported in January 2007, in the period between June 2006 and "the
end of November 2006" alone, "over 400 Palestinians were killed and some 1,500
injured. More than half of those killed and wounded were civilians. Of those killed
some 90 were children; and over 300 children were injured." Report of Special
Rapporteur 2006, supra note 3, 8.
34. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Security, supra note 14.
35. Livni Statements, supra note 31.
36. Id.
20091
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regime."37 Whether these statements have any legal validity is the
question to which we now turn.
III. Ongoing Occupation
The legal implications of the "hostile territory" designation and
the legality of the policies related to it are intimately related to
Gaza's continued status as a territory occupied by Israel. The "basic
legal standard" 38 defining occupation is contained in Article 42 of
the 1907 Hague Regulations, which states: "Territory is considered
occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the
hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where
such authority has been established and can be exercised." 39 The
definition of occupation contained in the Hague Regulations is
customary international law.40
Before its 2005 withdrawal, Israel occupied the Gaza Strip as a
matter of international law.41 This had been confirmed by the U.N.
Security Council,42 the U.N. General Assembly,43 the International
Court of Justice, 44 the Oslo Accords, 45 the Israeli Supreme Court,46
37. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Behind the Headlines: Israel Designates Gaza
a 'Hostile Territory', (Sept. 24, 2007), [hereinafter Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Behind]
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/About+the+Ministry/Behind+the+Headlines/
Gaza+designated+a+%E2%80%9CHostile+Territory%E2%80%9D+24-Sep-2007.htm.
38. Palestinian Liberation Organization - Negotiations Affairs Department, The
Israeli 'Disengagement' Plan: Gaza Still Occupied, [hereinafter PLO, Gaza],
http://www.nad-plo.org/inner.php?view=facts-gazaGAZA%20STILL%20
OCCUPIED (updated Sept. 2005) (Last Visited Apr. 8, 2009).
39. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its
annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 187 Consol.
T.S. 227 [hereinafter The Hague Convention].
40. Eyal Benvenisti, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 8 (1993).
41. Scobbie, supra note 4, at 12.
42. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1544, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1544 (May 19, 2004), which is cited
in PLO, Gaza, supra note 38.
43. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 58/292, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/292 (May 17, 2004), which
is cited in PLO, Gaza, supra note 38.
44. Legal Consequences of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, at 166 (July 9) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].
45. In reference to the Agreement on Preparatory Powers and Responsibilities,
the Palestinian Liberation Organization - Negotiations Affairs Department wrote:
The Oslo Accords specifically affirmed that that the Palestinian Territories
would remain under Israeli occupation until the conclusion and
implementation of a final peace treaty. Although the accords permitted
limited self-administration for some Palestinians, the Accords expressly
stated that the Gaza Strip and theWest Bank will continue to be considered
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and the U.S. Department of State.47 As noted above, however,
Israel's 2004 Disengagement Plan maintained that the Israeli
withdrawal would effectively end the occupation.48 Those who
argue that the withdrawal was in fact sufficient to end the
occupation generally point to the dismantling of Israeli settlements
in the Gaza Strip and the withdrawal of Israeli forces. Turning first
to the issue of the settlements, paragraph six of Article 49 of the
Fourth Geneva Convention clearly classifies the establishment of
settlements as an activity which an occupying power is prohibited
from undertaking, not as a condition of occupation itself. Article
49's plain language - "[tihe occupying Power shall not deport or
transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it
occupies" 49 - makes it clear that occupation itself in no way depends
on the transfer of the occupying power's civilians and that occupied
territory remains so whether or not the occupying power transfers
its civilians into the territory. Thus, the Israeli settlements were a
fact on the ground additional to the occupation itself, and while
dismantling the settlements brought Israel into compliance with
Article 49 (in Gaza), the absence of settlements in the Strip in no way
affects the territory's occupied status.
The withdrawal of Israeli troops is similarly insufficient to
terminate the occupation. As noted above, Article 42 of Hague
Regulations holds that a territory is occupied when it is "placed
one territorial unit, and that withdrawal from Palestinian population
centers will do nothing 'to change the status' of the West Bank and Gaza
Strip for the duration of the accords.
PLO, Gaza, supra note 36, referring to the Agreement on Preparatory Powers and
Responsibilities art. XIII, § 4 (Aug. 29, 1994).
46. See, e.g., Ayub, et al. v. Minister of Defense, et al, 606 I1. H.C. 78; Adjuri v.
IDF Commander, 17019 I1. H.C. 02 (2002); and 2056 I1. H.C. 04 (2004). These cases
are cited in PLO, Gaza, supra note 36, which states that "The Israeli Supreme Court
refers to the Palestinian territories as occupied and selectively enforces
international law with respect to the Israeli military presence there."
47. PLO, Gaza, supra note 36 (citing BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
LABOR, Israel and the Occupied Territories, in COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
PRACTICES 2003 (2004), available at http://www.state.gov.g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2003/27929.htm).
48. "Israel will evacuate the Gaza Strip .... As a result, there will be no basis
for claiming that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory." Disengagement Plan -
General Outline, supra note 2, § 2, arts. i(1)-(3).
49. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time
of War art. 49, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention] (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
2009]
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under the authority of the hostile army."50 The critical criterion
which determines "authority" is that of effective control.51 Effective
control does not require the permanent presence of military forces in
the territory. 52 This principle was enunciated by the Nuremburg
Tribunal in USA v. Wilhelm List, in which the tribunal stated that
"the test for application of the legal regime of occupation is not
whether the occupying power fails to exercise effective control over
the territory, but whether it has the ability to exercise such power."
5 3
In the List case, the Tribunal determined that German occupation of
Yugoslavia and Greece did not cease after the withdrawal of
German troops from those territories despite the exercise of some
control by indigenous forces because German forces could have
returned and exercised their ability to control the territories "at any
time they desired."54  The plain terms of Israel's Revised
Disengagement Plan make it clear that it maintains effective control
over Gaza to an extent that much exceeds the control retained by
Germany in the List case: "Israel will guard and monitor the external
land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive
authority in Gaza airspace, and will continue to exercise security
activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip."5 5 The Plan further
states that "Israel reserves its inherent right of self defense, both
preventive and reactive, including where necessary the use of force,
in respect of threats emanating from the Gaza Strip." 56 The full
implementation of the terms of the Disengagement Plan which
entail the retention by Israel of effective control of Gaza will be
discussed below, but two facts relevant to effective control and the
troop withdrawal should be discussed here. The first is that Israel
continues to undertake regular military activities conducted by
50. The Hague Convention, supra note 39, art. 42.
51. Scobbie, supra note 4, at 20.
52. Id. at 20-22.
53. See U.S.A. v. Wilhelm List, Nuremberg Tribunal, 1948. Quoted in
Palestinian Liberation Organization - Negotiations Affairs Department, "The Israeli
'Disengagement' Plan: Gaza Still Occupied," supra note 38.
54. Id., quoted in Scobbie, supra note 4, at 21.
55. Revised Disengagement Plan, supra note 4, § 3, art. 1.1.
56. See also PLO, Gaza, supra note 38, 1 IIB ("Israel will retain ultimate authority
over Gaza and to a much greater degree than Germany in The Hostages Case [List]:
The Israeli military expressly reserves itself the right to enter the Gaza Strip at will.
Further, Israel will not just retain the ability to exercise control over Gaza, but it will
also retain effective control over Gaza's borders, air and sea space, overall security,
and international relations.") (emphasis added).
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ground troops in Gaza. As noted above, releases from the Israeli
Ministry of Foreign Affairs explicitly state that Israel conducts
numerous operations within Gaza and that such missions result in
substantial Palestinian casualties.5 7 The second is that with the
"exclusive authority over Gaza airspace"58 contemplated in the
Revised Disengagement Plan, Israel regularly uses aircraft to
conduct operations against Palestinian militants and to carry out
targeted killings inside the Gaza Strip.59  The foregoing
demonstrates that while there is no longer a permanent Israeli troop
presence in Gaza, the Israeli military is still very much active in the
Strip. The nature of this involvement, especially when taken
together with other aspects of Israel's current relationship with
Gaza, makes it very clear that Israel's military withdrawal did not
constitute an end to the occupation.
As noted above, it is widely maintained that Gaza remains
occupied by Israel. This view has been accepted by, inter alia,
Human Rights Watch,60 the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,61
57. See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Terror, supra note 12. Israeli press
accounts are also instructive. For example, a recent report in Haaretz states,
"[aIccording to the IDF, troops entered the Gaza Strip early Thursday, and
penetrated some two kilometers into the Strip, east of the Maghazi refugee camp.
During the operation, soldiers fired on a group of gunmen, killing four and
wounding several others." Avi Issacharoff, Mijal Grinberg & Yuval Azoulay, IDF
Soldier Seriously Hurt, Seven Militants Killed in Gaza Raid, HAARETZ, Dec. 20,
2007, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/936700.htnl.
58. Revised Disengagement Plan, supra note 4, § 3, art. 1.1.
59. For example, Haaretz reported on Monday, December 17, 2007, that two
separate IDF airstrikes in Gaza killed a total of 6 people - all purported Palestinian
militants - and wounded two bystanders. The report stated that "Israel often
targets militants in airstrikes." Senior Islamic Jihad Commander Dies in IAF Strike on
Gaza City, HAARETZ, Dec. 18, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
spages/ 935475.html.
60. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Threatened, supra note 3, which states: "Israel
remains an occupying power in the Gaza Strip even though it withdrew its military
forces and illegal civilian settlers in August and September 2005."
61. The 2008 CIA World Factbook - updated as of Dec. 18, 2008, over two years
after the withdrawal - states that, "[the] West Bank and Gaza Strip are Israeli-
occupied with current status subject to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement -
permanent status to be determined through further negotiation; Israel removed
settlers and military personnel from the Gaza Strip in August 2005." It also
describes Gaza's "maritime claims" as "Israeli-occupied with current status subject
to the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement - permanent status to be determined
through further negotiation." U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENcY, 2008 CIA World
Factbook, available at https:/ /www.cia.gov/library/publications/download/.
2009]
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Amnesty International, 62 the Palestinian Liberation Organization, 63
the United States State Department,64 independent scholars, 65 and
the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Palestinian territories occupied since 1967.66 Israel's continued
status as an occupying power in the Gaza Strip derives from the
characteristics of its present relationship with Gaza. Several of these
characteristics, many of which were touched upon above, are
outlined in Israel's Revised Disengagement Plan. The Plan states
that Israel "will continue to maintain exclusive authority in Gaza
airspace." 67 This authority not only allows Israel to conduct military
airstrikes from Gaza's airspace but also gives Israel complete control
over any civil aviation within Gaza. Thus, for example, it is Israel,
not the Palestinians, who possess the authority to determine
whether an airport can be opened in Gaza68 or whether civilian
62. In its 2007 report on the Palestinian Authority, which dealt with both Gaza
and the West Bank, Amnesty International noted that "[t]he international
community took no measures to require Israel, as the occupying power, to meet its
obligation under international law to ensure the basic humanitarian needs of the
Palestinian population." Amnesty Int'l, Palestinian Authority - Amnesty International
Report 2007, http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/palestinian-authority/report-
2007.
63. See, e.g., PLO, Gaza, supra note 38 (stating that Israel "will remain the
occupying power" after the withdrawal).
64. See U.S. STATE DEP'T, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 2006:
Israel and the Occupied Territories, available at http://www.state.gov/g/
drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78854.htm. This report states that "Palestinians in the occupied
territories are not citizens of the country [Israel] and do not enjoy the rights of
citizens, even if living in areas under full Israeli authority or arrested in Israel" and
also that, "Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and East
Jerusalem during the 1967 War. In 2006 the population of Gaza was approximately
1.4 million." It includes events inside Gaza in its analysis of events in the
"Occupied Territories."
65. See Scobbie, supra note 4, at 30, stating that:
[iut is impossible to accept at face value and in good faith the provisions of
the Revised Disengagement Plan because of the contradictions it contains.
It is at once a claim both to divest Israel of responsibilities for Gaza's
population while retaining powers over the territory that would otherwise
fall to be exercised by the legitimate government . . . [It] is a classic
example of an occupant 'inclined to make use of arrangements where
authority is said to be exercised by [a] transitional government' in an
attempt to disguise the truth in the hope of evading responsibility.
(quoting Judge Kooijmans from Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case, 45
I.L.R. 359 (2006)).
66. Report of Special Rapporteur 2006, supra note 3, at 7.
67. Revised Disengagement Plan, supra note 4, § 3, art. 1.1.
68. PLO, Gaza, supra note 38.
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aircraft can travel through Gaza's airspace. The Revised
Disengagement Plan also retains for Israel the authority to "exercise
security activity in the sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip,"69 thus
allowing Israel "to exercise control of Gaza's maritime zones." 70
Accordingly, Israel is the sole authority capable of allowing or
disallowing a seaport in Gaza. 71
Israel also exercises exclusive control over who and what enters
and leaves the Gaza Strip. The crossings between Gaza and Israel
are controlled solely by Israel. To the South, the Rafah crossing
between Gaza and Egypt is operated according to the terms of an
agreement between the Palestinian Authority and Israel by which
Egypt and the PA administer the crossing.72  However, by
manipulating the terms of the agreement, Israel is able to shut down
the crossing at will.73 Taken together, Israel's control over Gaza's
sea space, air space, and border crossings allows Israel substantial
control over both the freedom of the inhabitants of Gaza to enter or
leave and the entire economy of the Strip.74 The Washington Post,
reporting on Israeli restrictions on imports into Gaza, recently
observed that "the punishing seal" imposed by the restrictions "has
reduced Gaza... to beggar status, unable to maintain an effective
public health care system, administer public schools or preserve the
traditional pleasures of everyday life ... ."75 Israel's power over the
inhabitants of Gaza is further enhanced by its continued control of
Gaza's water sewage, electricity, population registry, and
69. Revised Disengagement Plan, supra note 4, § 3, art 1.1.
70. Scobbie, supra note 4, at 29.
71. PLO, Gaza, supra note 38.
72. B'Tselem, Rafah, Crossing, http://www.btselem.org/english/GazaStrip/
RafahCrossing.asp (Last Visited Apr. 8, 2009).
73. Id. ("Israel [sic] capacity to close down the crossing stems from its ability to
prevent the EU monitors from reaching it [because the monitors reside in Israel].
According to the AMA [the Agreement on Movement and Access] the Rafah
Crossing is open only when the EU monitors are present.")
74. For example, the CIA has stated:
The Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in September 2005 offered
some medium-term opportunities for economic growth, which have not
yet been realized due to Israeli military activities in the Gaza Strip in 2006,
continued crossings closures, and the international community's financial
embargo of the PA after HAMAS took office in March 2006.
CIA World Factbook 2008, supra note 61.
75. Scott Wilson, Sealed off by Israel, Gaza Reduced to Beggary, WASH. PosT, Dec.
15, 2007, at Al.
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telecommunications networks.76
Israel's continued occupation is also evidenced by Gaza's
continuing lack of sovereignty. It has been argued that because
Gaza was in Egypt's possession before Israel's 1967 invasion and
occupation, and because Egypt did not have a legitimate legal claim
to Gaza, Israel's claim to Gaza is superior to Egypt's.77 According to
this argument, Israel cannot be considered an occupying power
because there is no legitimate sovereign to whom sovereignty
rightfully belongs.78 This argument is inconsistent with the modern
law of occupation, which acknowledges "that sovereignty lies in the
people and not its government." 79 It is the Palestinian People in
whom the right to sovereignty over the Occupied Territories is
vested. Thus, because "occupation terminates when authority
passes back into the hands of the displaced sovereign"80; because "a
State's sovereignty extends over its territorial sea, and to the
airspace above its territorial sea and land territory" 81; and because
Israel still exercises control over Gaza in these areas, Israel has not
permitted Palestinian sovereignty in Gaza and thus remains the
occupying power in the Strip.82
The Israeli "disengagement" was also inconsistent with the
right of self-determination of the Palestinian people.83 In its Legal
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory decision, the International Court of Justice ("ICJ")
confirmed the Palestinian right of self-determination, stating: "[a]s
regards the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination,
the Court observes that the existence of a 'Palestinian people' is no
longer in issue." 84 The Court further noted that "the right of peoples
to self-determination is today a right erga omnes." 85 Because the
Israeli disengagement was a unilateral Israeli action undertaken
76. Human Rights Watch, Civilians, supra note 5.
77. Ardi Imseis, On the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65, 94 (Winter 2003).
78. Id. at 93-95.
79. Imseis, supra note 77, at 92 quoting Benvenisti, supra note 38, at 29.
80. Scobbie, supra note 4, at 10.
81. Id. at 29-30.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 23-25, 29.
84. Advisory Opinion, supra note 44.
85. Id. This is noted in Scobbie, supra note 4, at 11.
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taken without any consultation with the Palestinians,86 and because
Gaza itself is not an independent self-determination unit, i.e., it is
only part of the Palestinian territory and is incapable of being
separated in status from the West Bank, the disengagement was not
in conformity with the Palestinian right of self-determination.
87
Thus, because "termination of occupation, to be legally effective,
must be in conformity with the requirements of self-
determination,"88 Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip was
insufficient to affect an end to the occupation.
As will be discussed below, Israel's ongoing status as an
occupying power is a central consideration in any analysis of its
obligations and responsibilities for the population of Gaza. That
status is also a fundamental factor influencing Israel's probable aims
in adopting the "hostile territory" designation, the issue to which
we now turn.
IV. The Designation - Israel's Aims
The "hostile territory" designation is likely intended to
accomplish five main purposes: (1) to narrow the spectrum of
humanitarian law applicable to Israel's actions in Gaza; (2) to blur
the applicability of those provisions of humanitarian law Israel
cannot escape entirely; (3) to rid Israel of human rights obligations
owed to the population of the Gaza Strip; (4) to add validity to
Israel's claim of the right to self-defense against Gaza; and (5) to
obfuscate Israel's status with regard to Gaza and legitimize Israel's
continued use of force in the eyes of the world. Each of these
probable aims will be dealt with in turn.
A. Narrowing the Spectrum of Applicable Humanitarian Law
That Israel intended to reduce its responsibilities to Gaza with
the "hostile territory" designation is clear from Israeli statements
released with the designation and in the following weeks. A
statement published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on
September 24, 2007, for example, states that "at the heart" of the
decision to classify Gaza as a "hostile territory" is "the principle that
although Israel remains committed to averting any humanitarian
86. Id. at 24-25.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 21.
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crisis, it does not feel required to provide any supplies which go
beyond that" and that "the determination [of Gaza's status]
provides the basis for sanctions on the Hamas regime." 89 Israel
immediately set about implementing these policies, instituting a
reduction in the fuel supplied to Gaza,90 and ordering a reduction in
Gaza's power supply. The order to reduce the flow of power into
the Strip was postponed by the Israeli High Court of Justice pending
an examination of the policy by the Court,91 but the government has
not withdrawn its plan and it may yet be implemented if the Court
so allows.
The day after Israel announced the "hostile territory"
designation and its planned sanctions, Human Rights Watch stated
that "cutting off fuel and electricity [to Gaza] would violate Israel's
duty as an occupying power to safeguard the health and welfare of
the occupied population."92 This statement went to the heart of
Israel's intent in adopting the designation. As Human Rights watch
noted, any Israeli reduction of fuel and electricity to Gaza will be
illegal due to Israel's continued status as an occupying power. But
by proclaiming Gaza a "hostile territory," Israel aims to free itself of
its status as an occupying power, thereby making its proposed
sanctions legal. The designation thus serves as a sort of second-step
in its attempt to divest itself of its responsibilities as an occupying
power. Israel's withdrawal from Gaza has served as claim that its
occupation has ended; with the "hostile territory" designation, Israel
is attempting to manufacture a situation in which the entity it once
occupied can be regarded as something else entirely: a separate
entity, which has changed substantially since the Israeli withdrawal,
is administered by a new government hostile to Israel, and which
can thus be regarded as a hostile territory - a quasi-state at war with
Israel and therefore not entitled to its protections.
The illegality of many of Israel's actions affecting Gaza, both
those it uses the "hostile territory" designation to justify and many
of those which were implemented before the designation, arises
89. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Behind, supra note 37.
90. Maza Mualem, Ministers Slam AG for Prohibiting Punitive Power Cuts to Gaza,
HAARETZ, Nov. 11, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
spages/922720.html.
91. Amos Harel, Analysis: Israel's Real Intention behind sanctions of the Gaza Strip,
HAARETZ, Oct. 26, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/
spages/917385.htm1.
92. Human Rights Watch, Threatened, supra note 3.
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from Israel's status as an occupying power. Specifically, Israel's
reduction of the fuel supply to Gaza, possible reduction of the
power supply, restrictions on imports (which affect the availability
of food and medical supplies), and crossing closures which inhibit
relief schemes by international organizations, 93 are violations of the
provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention which deal specifically
with occupation. 94 If Israel were able to narrow the spectrum of law
applicable to its actions by excluding the law of occupation, its
freedom of action in Gaza would be substantially increased. It
would accordingly be able to devise and implement new policies
without the constraints imposed by its responsibilities as an
occupying power and to continue existing policies while freeing
itself of its liability for those policies. Israel tried to accomplish such
a narrowing of applicable law with its withdrawal from Gaza, and
the "hostile territory" designation can be understood as an attempt
by Israel to distance itself from the occupation by another degree. It
has in effect placed two obstacles in the path of the claim that it still
occupies Gaza. As will be demonstrated below, however, because
the withdrawal did not end the occupation, and because the "hostile
territory" designation was not accompanied by any actual change of
the facts on the ground which establish Israel's effective control and
status as an occupying power, the designation did not succeed in
changing the status of the Strip, and Israel's responsibilities and
obligations for the population of Gaza have not been altered.
B. Humanitarian Law - Blurring Israel's Responsibility
Even if Israel were to successfully free itself from the
constraints of the law of occupation contained in the Hague
Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention, it would still be
bound by a substantial body of humanitarian law, in particular, the
93. Yuval Yoaz & Shlomo Shamir, EU Urges Israel to Consider Cuts in energy
Supplies to Gaza, HAARETZ, Oct. 30, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.com/
hasen/spages/918171.html.
94. Articles 47-78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention are those relating to
"Occupied Territories." Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49. Specific
provisions of these articles will be discussed below. As an occupying power, Israel
is also bound by relevant provisions of the Hague Regulations, including Articles
42, 43, 46 and 52. The Hague Convention, supra note 37. It should also be noted
(and it will also be discussed below) that some of Israel's actions and contemplated
actions would be illegal even if Israel were not the occupying power in Gaza. For
example, Article 33 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prohibits collective
punishment, is applicable whether or not a state of occupation exists. Id.
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remaining provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, in its
relations with the Gaza Strip. Distancing itself from these remaining
provisions of international humanitarian law, and establishing some
degree of plausible deniability of their applicability, is another likely
aim of the "hostile territory" designation.
Since the West Bank and Gaza Strip came under Israeli control
in 1967, Israel has maintained that the Fourth Geneva Convention is
not applicable to those territories.95 The basis for this argument lies
in the wording of Article two of the Convention, which states: "the
present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any
other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties.. "96 Because its present conflict with
the Palestinians is not between two "High Contracting Parties,"
Israel has taken the position that the Convention does not apply.97
This position, which was never widely accepted, 98 was further
discredited in 2004 with the ICJ's Wall decision. In that case, the
Court held that the Fourth Geneva Convention, being "applicable in
any occupied territory in the event of an armed conflict arising
between two or more High Contracting Parties," applied in the West
Bank because "Israel and Jordan were parties to that Convention
when the 1967 armed conflict broke out."99 Because both Egypt and
Israel were parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention in 1967, this
logic plainly makes the Convention applicable in Gaza.
The 2005 withdrawal and the "hostile territory" designation
provide Israel with two degrees of separation from the logic of the
ICJ's Wall decision. With the withdrawal, it became possible for
Israel to assert that the situation prevailing at the time of the
decision had changed - that the conflict which began in 1967 had
come to an end. With the "hostile territory" designation, Israel can
maintain that the conflict with Gaza - an enemy entity controlled by
Hamas - is qualitatively different from the original conflict with
Egypt which resulted in the Israeli occupation of Gaza. Because it is
now possible to assert that the first conflict has ended, and that the
second conflict with a Hamas-controlled Gaza is not between two
"High Contracting Parties," Israel can now make the claim that the
95. Imseis, supra note 77, at 93.
96. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, art. 2.
97. Imseis, supra note 77, at 93-95.
98. Id. at 95.
99. Advisory Opinion, supra note 44.
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Fourth Geneva Convention does not apply in Gaza even if one
accepts logic of the Wall decision.
As is the case with the law of occupation, however, Israel has
not successfully divested itself of its obligations and responsibilities
under the Fourth Geneva Convention. Though its maneuvering
since the Wall decision might serve to blur the reasoning which
makes the Fourth Geneva Convention applicable to its actions in
Gaza and might further convolute its relationship with the Strip, the
fundamental facts have not changed - Israel remains an occupying
power, and Gaza remains the same territory which Israel has
occupied since June of 1967. Accordingly, Israel is still bound by the
Fourth Geneva Convention in relation to Gaza.
C. Ridding Israel of its Human Rights Obligations for Gaza
The "hostile territory" designation might also allow Israel to
obfuscate the nature of its human rights obligations to the
inhabitants of the Gaza Strip. In its Wall decision, the ICJ rejected
Israel's argument that the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social
and Cultural Rights do not apply in the Occupied Territories.100 As
with the areas of law discussed above, however, the withdrawal
from Gaza and the "hostile territory" designation allow Israel to
distance itself from the clear applicability of human rights law. In
effect, since 2005 Israel has manufactured a relationship with the
Gaza Strip which is legally unchanged but which is superficially
different in a number of ways, creating what amounts to a legal
smokescreen. Thus, while Israel maintains a relationship with Gaza
that is legally identical to that which existed when the Wall decision
came down, it can point to its withdrawal and the "hostile territory"
designation and make the claim that the situation is entirely
different than that which prevailed in 2005. Any such reasoning
does not effectively free Israel from its human rights obligations in
the Occupied Territories. This is clear from the Wall decision, which
states that "the protection offered by human rights conventions does
not cease in case of armed conflict, save through provisions for
derogation" and that "the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights is applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the
exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory." 101 Thus, no
100. Id. 4, 110, 181.
101. Id. 106, 111.
20091
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
change in Gaza's status - real or contrived - can serve to free Israel
of its responsibilities under human rights law while Gaza remains
under Israel's effective control or while Israel exercises its
jurisdiction in connection with the inhabitants of that territory. 102
But such purported status changes do serve as a basis for obscuring
Israel's responsibility - for creating bogus arguments which must be
addressed before a clear case can be made for Israeli responsibility.
D. Adding Validity to the Claim of Self-defense
Designating the Gaza Strip a "hostile territory" may also serve
as a basis for a claim by Israel that its use of force against Gaza is
justifiable as self-defense. As a party to the United Nations Charter,
Israel is entitled to the right of self-defense in accordance with the
terms of Article 51 of the Charter, which states: "[n]othing in the
present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations." 103 Frequent rocket attacks emanating from
Gaza could be classified as an "armed attack" sufficient to justify an
Israeli response in self-defense. However, in its Wall decision, the
ICJ held that attacks on Israel conducted from the West Bank do not
give rise to an Israeli right of self-defense because the West Bank is
not a state. "Article 51 of the Charter," the Court stated, "recognizes
the existence of an inherent right of self-defense in the case of armed
attack by one State against another State. However, Israel does not
claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign state." 04
Because the Gaza Strip is also a non-state entity, the Court's
reasoning clearly leads to the conclusion that Israel cannot invoke
Article 51 to justify its use of force against the Strip. However, with
the "hostile territory" designation, Israel has attempted to paint
Gaza with state-like attributes. The designation casts the Strip as an
entity which is wholly separate from Israel, which is owed no
102. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Steven R. Ratner, & David Wippman, INTERNATIONAL
LAW: NORMs, AcroRs, PRocEss, A PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH 452 (Aspen
Publishers 2006) quoting Committee, General Comment No. 31 [80] Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) (stating that "a State Party must respect
and ensure the rights laid down in the Covenant [i.e., the ICCPR] to anyone within
the power or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the
territory of that State party").
103. U.N. Charter art. 51.
104. Advisory Opinion, supra note 44, 139.
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responsibilities by Israel, and which acts in international affairs like
any ordinary state. Thus, when explaining the "hostile territory"
designation and the sanctions associated with it, the Israeli Ministry
of Foreign Affairs stated that "[n]o government can be expected to
fail to react when its towns and cities are subjected to deliberate
bombardments from a neighboring territory." 105 This statement
obscures the fact that Gaza is not simply a "neighboring territory"
but is a non-state entity which is occupied by Israel and to which
Israel owes responsibilities as a matter of international law.
Despite Israeli actions since the ICJ Wall decision, the facts
which provide the fundamental basis for the Court's denial of
Israel's claimed legal right of self-defense remain intact - Gaza is
still not a state, and it is still occupied by Israel. Thus, no matter
how the smoke and mirrors are arranged, any argument that Israel
has somehow gained a new right of self-defense against Gaza must
fail.
E. Obfuscation and Legitimization
The "hostile territory" designation represents an attempt by
Israel to evade international law, and it lays the foundations for a
host of faulty legal arguments in support of Israeli action, creating,
along with previous Israeli policies and positions, a maze of
manufactured misconceptions, contorted logic, and obscured legal
relationships. But while the designation is intended to blur Israel's
legal relationship with Gaza, it is also intended to have an effect
outside the legal sphere. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs has
stated that the designation is a "factual (rather than legal)
description of the region controlled by Hamas." 10 6 The "hostile
territory" designation is an attempt to re-brand Israel's conflict with
Gaza, to cast it in simple terms that can be exploited in the realm of
public relations. By omitting certain crucial facts, such as the
ongoing occupation of Gaza and the extent to which Israel continues
to operate inside Gaza and kill its inhabitants,107 Israel creates the
illusion that it is in the right, acting solely to defend itself, and left
with little choice but to act as it does. As Noam Chomsky has noted:
105. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Behind, supra note 37.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Terror, supra note 12. As noted above
this MFA report states that in only three months, forty Palestinians from Gaza were
killed by Israeli forces, all apparently within Gaza.
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"the designation 'enemy entity' is just a pretext for even more
savage torture of the people of Gaza - particularly, to punish them
for the crime of having voted the wrong way in a free election."108
V. Israel Still Controls Gaza
The central fact in analyzing the legal effect of the "hostile
territory" designation is that it was not accompanied by any
changes in Israel's continuing effective control of the Gaza Strip.
Israel still controls Gaza's airspace, coast, electricity, population
registry, telecommunications networks, and water sewage1 09; still
exercises complete "control over the movement of goods into the
Gaza Strip"110; still reserves the right to use force in Gaza"'; and still
conducts military operations there on a regular basis.112
Accordingly, the designation is, in effect, mere words.
A "belligerent occupant is prohibited from altering the status of
the occupied territory... ."113 Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention provides that persons in occupied territory "shall not be
deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits
of the present Convention" by any attempted change in the status of
the territory by the occupying power.14 Article 47 does not
specifically envision attempts by an occupying power to evade its
responsibilities simply by coining a new phrase to describe the
occupied territory, but neither does international law anywhere
provide that such a designation will have any legal significance.
Thus, in the final analysis, an occupation by any other name is still
an occupation, and by its "hostile territory" designation Israel has
not brought about an end to its occupation or divested itself of any
of its responsibilities for Gaza's inhabitants.
108. E-mail from Noam Chomsky to author (Oct. 15, 2007) (on file with author).
109. Human Rights Watch, Civilians, supra note 5.
110. B'Tselem, supra note 7.
111. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Security, supra note 14.
112. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
113. Imseis, supra note 77, at 91.
114. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, art. 47.
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VI. Conclusion
Israel's Current Policies and Continuing Responsibilities
under International Humanitarian Law
Israel is bound in its relations with Gaza by international
humanitarian law. As an occupying power, it is bound by the law
of occupation, including that contained in the Hague Regulations"15
and the Fourth Geneva Convention. In light of Israel's current
policies, several provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention are of
particular importance.
Article 50 of the Convention requires that the occupying power
"facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care
and education of children."" 6 Israel's severe restrictions on the
entry of goods into Gaza place a serious burden on the proper
functioning of such institutions. The Washington Post recently
reported, for example, that the Israeli restrictions are preventing
many deaf children, taught by a society for the deaf in the Gaza
Strip, from receiving hearing aid batteries.117
Article 55 of the Convention states that an occupying power "to
the fullest extent of the means available to it... has the duty of
ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population." 118 Israeli
restrictions on imports and crossing closures severely hinder the
delivery of such food and medical supplies. This concern is
regularly voiced by human rights groups and international
organizations. For example, in response to a recent closure, the U.N.
World Food Program stated that "closing the crossing enhanced the
'vulnerability' of Gaza's 1.5 millions inhabitants, many of whom
rely on food hand outs."119 Human Rights Watch has also noted
that "in contemporary societies, power and fuel are closely
intertwined with access to food and health care, and cutting off
these would doubtlessly have a serious impact on the health and
well-being of the civilian population" of Gaza. 20 Israel's reduction
115. The Hague Regulations require, inter alia, that Israel ensure public order
and safety [in Article 43] and respect "family honor and rights, the lives of persons,
and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice [in Article 46]."
The Hague Convention, supra note 39.
116. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, art. 50.
117. Wilson, Sealed, supra note 75.
118. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, art. 55.
119. Id. art. 50.
120. Human Rights Watch, Threatened, supra note 3.
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of the fuel supply to Gaza and pending reduction of the energy
supply are thus not in accord with the requirements of Article 55.
Similarly, the fuel reductions and contemplated electricity
reductions are not in accord with Article 56 of the Convention,
which holds that "the Occupying power has the duty of ensuring
and maintaining.., the medical and hospital establishments and
services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory."
121
Israel's restrictions on imports into the strip are also inconsistent
with Article 56 to the extent that they lead to a deterioration of
hospital and hygiene conditions. For example, it was recently
reported that in Gaza City's Shifa Hospital, "the dispensary is out of
85 essential medicines and close to using up almost 150 others" and
that "dialysis treatment has been cut back from three to two times a
week for even the most critically ill kidney patients." 122
Article 59 of the Fourth Geneva Convention allows for relief
schemes consisting of "consignments of foodstuffs, medical
supplies, and clothing" and states that "all contracting parties shall
permit the free passage of these consignments and shall guarantee
their protection." 123 Israeli crossing closures and import restrictions
interfere with the free passage of such relief consignments. A recent
article in Haaretz, reporting on the closing of the Sufa crossing,
stated: "[t]he only outlet now remaining open to humanitarian aid is
the Southern-most Kerem Shalom crossing." 124 The article noted
that a U.N. World Food Program spokeswoman "warned that the
remaining crossing... lacked the capacity to meet Gaza's daily
needs of basic foods. " 125
Also of particular importance to Israel's current and
contemplated policies relating to Gaza is Article 33 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention. Article 33 states: "[nlo protected person may
be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed.
Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of
terrorism are prohibited." 126 Israel's reductions in the fuel supply to
121. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, art. 56.
122. Wilson, Sealed, supra note 75.
123. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, art. 59.
124. Yuval Yoaz & Shlomo Shamir, UN Chief Urges End to Qassams, Opposes Israeli
Punitive Measures, HAARETZ, Oct. 29, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz.
com/hasen/spages/918171.html.
125. Id.
126. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 49, art. 33.
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Gaza, which are justified by Israel as a response to the firing of
rockets from the Strip,127 violate Article 33's prohibition of collective
punishment. Similarly, if Israel's proposed energy reductions are
implemented, they will constitute a violation of Article 33.
Israel's continuing obligations to the population of the Gaza
Strip are extensive, and for reasons of economy cannot all be
catalogued here. Some of the important provisions of the applicable
international humanitarian law have been discussed in light of their
relevance to Israel's high-profile activities, but the list produced
above is by no means exhaustive. With its "hostile territory"
designation, Israel might have superficially obscured its obligations
under the applicable bodies of law, but the basis for its obligations
remains. Israel is thus bound by the same international law that it
was before the designation was adopted on September 19, 2007. It
must observe this law in its relations with Gaza. Elementary
principles of morality require no less.
127. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Behind, supra note 37.
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